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NOTES

unused servitude.1 4 The latter occurrence, however, should have
had no bearing on whether a trespass occurred. Despite the
rather broad holding, there were indications that the result
might be limited to the facts of the present case. 15 Application
of unqualified language in the case would indicate that the existence of a constitutional remedy forecloses the use of a civil
remedy or modifies the damages recoverable by the latter. 16
Considering the express waiver of sovereign immunity, it would
seem that there are few persuasive reasons why the state should
not be responsible for damages arising from an unlawful entry
to the same extent as an individual.
Robert W. Collings

FEDERAL LAW AND SEASHOaE ACCRETION
Plaintiff, owner of a tract of land on the Pacific Ocean in the
State of Washington, brought an action in state court to quiet
title to alluvion formed since 1889, the date of the state's admission to the Union. Title derived from a federal patent issued before statehood which conveyed title "to the line of ordinary high
tide."' Plaintiff claimed all alluvion formed after 1889. The trial
court held that federal rather than state law governed since title
derived from a federal patent issued before statehood and that
under common law plaintiff had a right to the alluvion. Under
state law she would not have acquired title to the alluvion because the State Constitution 2 provided that all lands accreted
14. 250 La. 1045, 1063, 202 So.2d 24, 30 (1967): "In truth, the supplemental
order of expropriation was invalid solely because of a legal error of a technical nature and, as a result of it, plaintiffs obtained a windfall of $37,145, or
as (sic) least $36,000, for the unused borrow pit."
15. By way of dicta the court offered two other possible bases for the
holding in the case. They indicated that under the facts given there had
been no tortious act committed and, in any event, the plaintiff was estopped
by his failure to get an injunction to prevent the unlawful action by the
state. It is interesting to speculate whether the cost of an injunction proceeding to the state, in possibly closing down an interstate highway construction project, would have exceeded the damages sought for the alleged
trespass.
16. 250 La. 1045, 1059, 202 So.2d 24, 29 (1967): "The measure of compensation is to be estimated by the same standards whether the property is
formally expropriated in accordance with law or appropriated by the condemning authority so long as it is intentionally taken for a public use."
1. Hughes v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 799, n.801, 410 P.2d 20 (1966).
2. WASH. CONST. art. 17, § 1: Declarationof State Ownership. "The state
of Washington asserts its ownership to the beds and shores of all navigable
waters in the state up to and including the line of ordinary high tide, in
waters where the tide ebbs and flows, and up to and including the line of
ordinary high water within the banks of all navigable rivers and lakes."
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after statehood are public beach and shore.3 The State Supreme
Court reversed, holding that state law controlled because "riparian rights in the several states are settled by the respective
states for themselves,"4 and because "littoral rights of the upland
owners have terminated" in 1889. 5 In reversing, the United States
Supreme Court held that federal law governs the ownership of
accretion gradually deposited by the ocean on adjoining upland
property conveyed by the United States prior to statehood.
Hughes v. Washington, 88 S.Ct. 438 (1967).
Federal courts have held that federal law alone governs the
disposition of public lands, the construction of grants by the
United States7 and the navigability of a river which determines
the extent of a federal grant.8 Where a patent borders on navigable water, the Supreme Court has said that the patent extends
only to the mean high water mark, and that state law governs
riparian or littoral rights and ownership below the high water
mark.9 Accretion or erosion had been commonly considered a
problem of riparian or littoral rights. Changes in the low water
mark pose no factual conflict between federal principles and
state laws governing accretion or erosion. Modification of the
high water line probably posed no occasion for a conflict of law
because the common law heritage was shared by the bulk of the
states and the federal government. The old decisions, 10 therefore, had no reason to clarify whether changes in the high water
line were controlled by state riparian or federal boundary law.
But concerning the seashore, the law of a few states is now quite
different from the federal common law on changes in the seashore. Those states that do not apply the rules of accretion
along the seashore use the theory that the seaward boundary
was fixed permanently at the date of the state's admission to the
union. The Hughes decision has the effect of saying that where
there is a federal patent issued before statehood, the boundary is
3. Hughes v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 799, 410 P.2d 20 (1966).
4. Id. at 812.
5. Id. at 816.
6. E.g., Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 92 (1871); Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498 (1939).
7. Borax Consolidated v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935); United
States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1,701 (1935); French-Glenn Livestock Co. v.
Springer, 185 U.S. 47 (1902); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 611 (1891).
8. E.g., United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931); United States v. Holt
State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States,
260 U.S. 77 (1922).
9. E.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
10. Id.

NOTES

1968]

not a fixed unchanging line, but shifts with the movement of
the mean high water mark.
The Hughes decision relied heavily on Borax Consolidated v.
City of Los Angeles," which involved a federal patent issued
after statehood on an island in Los Angeles Harbor. The issue
being the definition of mean high tide, the Supreme Court in that
case affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals which chose
the federal definition rather than the definition developed by
the state courts. 12 It further stated that:
"the question as to the extent of this federal grant, that is,
as to the limit of the land conveyed, or the boundary between
the upland and the tideland, is necessarily a federal question. It is a question which concerns the validity and effect
of an act done by the United States; it involves the ascertainment of the essential basis of a right asserted under
federal law."'13
The Hughes Court acknowledged that Borax did not deal with
the question of accretion, but pointed out that the Borax rule
applies "whether doubt as to any boundary is based on a broad
question as to the general definition of shoreline or on a particu' 4
larized problem relating to the ownership of accretion."'
The rule set forth in Hughes, however, seems to conflict with
the line of cases holding that "the grants of the government for
lands bounded on streams and other waters, without any reservation or restriction of terms, are to be construed as to their
effect according to the law of the state in which the lands lie."'15
Although this particular statement of the rule was clouded by
the issue of ownership of nonnavigable lakes,' 6 it was set forth
more explicitly in Shively v. Bowlby:17 "The title and rights of
riparian or littoral proprietors in the soil below high water mark,
therefore, are governed by the laws of the several states, subject
11. 296 U.S. 10 (1935).
12. The Court chose the formula of the United States Coast and Geodetic

Survey which is the average height of the high water over a period of 18.6
years. Id.

at 27.

13. Id. at 22.
14. 88 S. Ct. at 440.
15. Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 384 (1891); accord, Port of Seattle
v. Oregon & W. R.R., 255 U.S. 56 (1921); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894);
Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661 (1891); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876).
16. The Hardin rule is somewhat confusing insofar as it relates to nonnavigable waters. Compare Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 384 (1891), with

United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935).
17. 152 U.S

1, 57-58 (1894).
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to the rights granted to the United States by the constitution."
The rationale underlying the rule stemmed from earlier decisions
that upon admission to the Union, states acquire title to the bottoms of navigable waters by virtue of their inherent sovereignty.'8 Because the states owned the lands below the high water
mark, it was only reasonable that state law should govern the
disposition of the beds. The rule in Shively speaks of the "rights
of riparian or littoral proprietors," but, in fact, the cases it summarized dealt only with a limited number of riparian rights.
The Shively court summarized the historical development of the
rule and cited numerous cases, none of which treated the question of accretion as a riparian right. The cited cases concerned
primarily the question of ownership to the high water mark or
low water mark or thread of the river, the right to build piers,
or the right to fill in portions of the bed. A later case added to
the list the question of water rights of the public. 19
Prior to Hughes the question of rights to littoral alluvion
had never been put squarely before the Court.20 But in the case
of Jones v. Johnston,2' concerning the right to alluvion on Lake
Michigan, the Court said, "Land gained from the sea either by
alluvion or dereliction, if the same be by little and little, by
small and imperceptible degrees, belongs to the owner of the
land adjoining." This is in line with the common law, which
reasons that if an owner bears the risk of losing land by action
of the water, it is only equitable that he also should have the
chance to gain. Another important consideration is the right of
access to the water. 22 The French would describe the situation
as a kind of aleatory contract; however, under French law and
Louisiana law, the rule does not apply to the seashore. 28 In Louisiana today the littoral owner on the Gulf of Mexico or on arms
of the sea has no right to alluvion and no right to the beds of
18. E.g., Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 471 (1850); Pollard v. Hagan,
44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845); Martin v. Waddel, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).

This rule, however, was severely limited by the case of United States v.
California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947), which restricted its meaning to inland waters.
19. St. Anthony Falls Water-Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Comm'rs, 168
U.S. 379 (1897).
20. Technically, there is a distinction between the terms riparian and
littoral. The former pertains to water courses; the latter, to the sea. But

the courts often use them interchangeably.
21. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 150, 156 (1855).

22. See Hall, Rights of the Crown in the Sea-Shore, in A HISTORY OF THE
FORESHORE, 787 (S. Moore, ed. 1888); Annot., 58 L.R.A. 193 (1901).
23. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 450, 451, 453, 510 (1870); Zeller v. Southern Yacht
Club, 34 La. Ann. 837 (1882); Milne v. Girodeau, 12 La. 324 (1838); French
Civil Code arts. 556, 557; LAURENT, PRINCIPEs no 291 (2d ed. 1876).
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adjoining waters which might have encroached upon his former
boundaries by erosion.24 Except in the case of erosion, the law
treats the boundary as unchanged since 1812.
The federal cases, however, seem to look upon the riparian
boundary not as a fixed line, but as a shifting line. In the Jones
case as in the case of County of St. Clair v. Lovingston,2 5 the
Court discussed the question of accretion as a boundary problem.
The discussion was centered on the nature of the property description and on the effect of a description in the deed which
included a river as one boundary. A later case, citing Jones
with approval, said, "it justifies the view announced by the circuit court in its opinion, that when a water-line is the boundary
of a given lot, that line, no matter how it shifts, remains the
boundary, and a deed describing the lot by number or name conveys the land up to such shifting line exactly as it does up to a
fixed side line."26 Thus one might conclude that the Court looks
upon the question of accretion not so much as a riparian or
littoral light but merely a question of shifting boundaries. If this
is the case, then the application of the rule that state law applies
to the determination of riparian rights can be obviated by declaring that it applies only below the high water mark and that
the high water mark shifts with the alluvion.Y
It should be noted that the boundary in question in the
Hughes rule is the boundary of the original federal grant and
that such a boundary governs modern titles only when the
modern boundary purports to be the same as that of the federal
grant. State law governs the question of title to and disposition
of property within the state once title is no longer vested in
the United States.2 8 Thus, for example, if a party fulfills the requirements of ten- or thirty-year acquisitive prescription, he
24. See Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1936), dealing with
a navigable lake, whch based its decision not on LA. CIVIL CODE art. 510 but
on arts. 450, 453 (1870).
25. 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46 (1874).
26. Jefferis v. East Omaha Land Co., 134 U.S. 178, 196 (1890).
27. But cf. St. Louis Public Schools v. Risely, 77 U.S. (10 wall.) 91 (1869),
where the Court spoke in terms of a right to accretion along property in
Missouri acquired prior to the Louisiana Purchase and confirmed by Act
of Congress in 1812.
28. Kerr v. The Devisees of Moon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 565 (1824); Clark v.
Graham, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 577 (1821); United States v. Crosby, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch.) 115 (1812), which hold that the title to and disposition of real property is governed exclusively by the law of the state In which the property
is located.
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may acquire alluvion on the basis of his 29possession, thereby
changing the boundary of the federal grant.
Apart from the issue of the federal law of shifting boundaries,
the Hughes case raises by implication the question of the constitutionality of any state statute which purports to deprive the
riparian owner of the alluvion even where there is no federal
patent involved. The Lovingston case stated that the right to alluvion is a natural and vested right.80 One might conclude from
this that a state legislature is not free to arbitrarily fix the boundary on a watercourse or on the seashore, regardless of the policy
reasons favoring such an action. There might be sound reasons
for permanently fixing the boundaries, especially in regard to
2
mineral rights."' In the case of Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson,3
the Court proceeded on the assumption that a state has such a
power, but it dodged the issue by holding that the right of Congress to regulate commerce and navigation takes precedence over
any private rights. Even if a state does have the power to fix
the boundary along a watercourse or the seashore, the Louisiana
rule regarding the seashore lacks the balancing factors which
would justify such a rule. To make the Louisiana rule more reasonable it would be necessary to grant to the littoral proprietor
title to the bed of the sea which encroached upon his former
boundaries by erosion. 33 Under the present state of the law the
littoral owner loses title to land eroded by the sea or arms of
34
the sea.
Although the federal law appears to be consistent on the
issue of the extent of seashore patents, one case, Ker & Co. v.
Couden,85 applied the traditional civil law rule of accretion on
the seashore. But the setting of the dispute was the Philippine
Islands, at that time within the jurisdiction of the Court. There
it was pointed out that the law of the Philippines on the matter
29.
30.
Cotton
11 La.

Saulet v. Shepherd, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 504 (1867).
90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46 (1874). Compare Municipality No. 2 v. Orleans
Press, 18 La. 122 (1841) with Heirs of Delord v. City of New Orleans,
Ann. 699 (1856). The former case states that the right to alluvion is

a vested right while the latter states that it is a pure gratuity by the state.
31. LA. R.S. 9:1151 (1952) prescribes that changes in ownership resulting
from accretion or dereliction on a navigable stream, bay, or lake will not
affect existing mineral leases on the property. Cf. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 15,
forbidding divestiture of vested rights unless for purposes of public utility
and for just and adequate compensation previously paid. If the right to alluvion is a vested right, the constitutionality of R.S. 9:1151 is doubtful.
32. 223 U.S. 605 (1912).
33. See YIANNOPOULOS, CiviL LAw OF PROPERTY § 32, at 98, 99 (1966).
34. See note 24 supra.
35. 223 U.S. 268 (1912).
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derived from the ancient Spanish law, dating back to the Institutes of Justinian.3 6 However, the Court also explicitly stated
that "we are dealing with the law of the Philippines, not with
that which prevails in this country, whether of mixed antecedents or the common law. ' 3 7 In Louisiana, a mixed jurisdiction,
a large portion of the property titles derive from grants made
under the common law. The state title in the waterbottoms rests
upon a common law doctrine, and the lands divested from the
federal government were originally governed by the common
law. Thus where the Court is faced with a rule of property law
that it views as unjust, it might turn to the common law origin
of the title to justify applying the federal law.88
However, if the Court restricts its future decisions to the
strict holding of Hughes, the effect on Louisiana property law
will be relatively small since the large majority of littoral federal
patents in this state were issued after statehood. However, there
is no logical reason for limiting the rule to patents granted before statehood. The Borax case, relied upon heavily by the Court,
involved a patent issued after statehood, as did a lower court
decision cited by the Court. This latter case held that federal law
governs the right to alluvion on the seashore of property granted
under a trust patent issued to a Quinault Indian. 89 But this case
might be distinguished on the grounds that the property was still
owned by the United States. If the Court were to decide not
to extend the rule, it could hold that in the case of property
patented after statehood the ancestors in title of the plaintiff
were never governed by the federal common law. But the Court
could easily apply the Borax rule and hold that the question of
the extent of a federal grant is necessarily a federal question and
thus even patents issued after statehood are governed by federal
law, insofar as the boundaries are concerned.
The problem is by no means moot in Louisiana. Considerable
litigation has resulted from the question of the seaward shifting
political boundaries of the state, which was not at issue in
Hughes.40 Because of Hughes the dispute in the future will be
36. INSTITUTES 2.1.1.

37. 223 U.S. 268, 279 (1912).
38. Compare LA. R.S. 9:1101 (1950) with the holding of United States v.
Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935), which reflect an apparent conflict between the
federal and state law insofar as the latter purports to vest title of the beds
of non-navigable waters in the state.
39. United States v. Washington, 294 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 817 (1962).
40. See 43 U.S.C. § 1301-1312 (1953), which both resolved and created
litigious issues.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVIII

more involved with the private law than with the political debate. Under this law arises the question of how to treat those
bodies of water classified as arms of the sea, such as Lake Pontchartrain, 41 to which heretofore the rule of accretion has not
applied. There is also the question of what effect the new rule
has on the French and Spanish land grants confirmed by Congress. It probably will have no effect since it has been held that
the nature of such a confirmation is that of a quitclaim deed be42
cause title never vested in the United States.
If the rule of Hughes is extended to include patents issued
after statehood and applied to Louisiana, it would greatly affect
Louisiana property. law. Such an application would oppose the
basic policy of the law which seeks security and stability of titles.
The only persons who would gain by such a drastic change in the
law are the littoral proprietors, but the result would be a great
expense to Louisiana taxpayers. Even though the Court has recently said, "Whether latent federal power should be exercised
' 43
to displace state law is primarily a decision for Congress,
the decision of Hughes suggests that the Court views the type of
rule found in Louisiana as unfair, and in all probabilities will
change it insofar as it relates to federal patents.
P. Michael Hebert

GOOD FAITH FOR PURPOSES OF AcQuIsITIvE PREscRIPTION
IN LOUISIANA AND FRANCE
Ten-year acquisitive prescription of immovables in Louisiana is regulated by Civil Code articles 3478-3482. These articles
require that the adverse possessor be in good faith. As defined
by article 3451, the good faith possessor is he "who has just reason to believe himself the master of the thing which he possesses,
although he may not be in fact."' Conversely, as defined by
41. Zeller v. Southern Yacht Club, 34 La. Ann. 837 (1882).
42. Beard v. Federy, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 478 (1865).
43. Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)
(mineral leases).

1. Article 503 defines the bona fide possessor for purposes of determining the ownership of fruits of an immovable. "He is a bona fide possessor
who possesses as owner by virtue of an act sufficient in terms to transfer
property, the defects of which he was ignorant of." This definition is
consistent with that of article 3451. The courts have construed the two
definitions in part materia. Vance v. Sentell, 178 La. 749, 758, 152 So. 513,
516 (1934).

